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Corporate tax reforms carried out in EU countries since 1980 entail lower statutory tax rates 
and reductions in generous tax depreciation provisions. Several countries including the UK 
have reduced tax rates for SMEs. This study compares incentive effects of such reforms on 
the SMEs’ investment decisions adopting simple present value model. Ceteris paribus tax rate 
and depreciation rule vary in the model simulation, while the application of historical cost 
accounting method in inflationary phases leads to fictitious increases in nominal net present 
value. Apart from the construction of international ranking, country- specific patterns of 
reform effects are also illustrated. 
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Introduction 
 
The vast majority of firms that operate in advanced countries are small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs). Therefore, SMEs’ competitiveness significantly affects the 
competitive position of the country’s economy as a whole. The concentration of SMEs’ 
activities on domestic market leads to the bounded business vision. Combined with the 
asymmetric information about the profit opportunities abroad, this fact tends to limit the 
diversification of SMEs’ investments in an international context. Consequently they 
appear to be more directly affected by the national corporate tax reform than is the case 
with large multinational firms. On the other hand, SMEs have quite often been the pri-
mary target group of such an investment promotion policy (Hendricks, Amit and Whis-
tler, 1997; Chen, Lee and Mintz, 2002; Devereux, Griffith and Klemm, 2004). Accord-
ing to Coyne (1995), SMEs are generally more responsive to domestic tax incentives 
than large ones. Taxes may play a more important role in the cost structure of SMEs 
because they do not have the financial and human capacity to developed sophisticated 
tax avoidance strategies. 
Some EU countries including the UK have traditionally had lower tax rates for 
SMEs, whereas such a corporate tax reduction does not exist in countries like Austria, 
Finland and Germany at all (see Table 1). Although it is disputable, those countries that 
provide fiscal incentives and preferential tax treatment to SMEs claim that they (i) cre-
ate a large number of jobs and (ii) enhance the level of entrepreneurship, which implies 
flexibility, speed, risk-taking and innovation (Chen, Lee and Mintz, 2002). A further 
reason for the tax policy attention paid to the SMEs is that they represent “an important 
breeding ground for large, profitable, tax-paying employers of the future and [experi-
ence] high growth rates in comparison to large enterprises” (Hendricks, Amit and Whis-
tler, 1997, p. 1). 
The definition of SMEs for tax purpose also differs from one country to another. In 
the UK SMEs are generally those firms that yield profits between GBP 50,000 and GBP 
300,000 annually. For the limited years from 2000 to 2002, Ireland also had a corporate 
tax rate of 12.5% for SMEs. Yet the total trading income on which this reduced rate was 
imposed changed from € 63,500 (2000) to € 254,000 (2001). France has recently intro-
duced a special tax rule for SMEs but in a rather limited manner: those companies that 
realise a maximum turnover of € 7,630,000 and at least 75% of whose capital is con-
tinuously owned by individuals or companies satisfying the same conditions are subject 
to corporate tax at a reduced rate of 15% (2004) on the proportion of the taxable profit 
that does not exceed € 38,120 (Chen, Lee and Mintz, 2002; KPMG Corporate Tax Rate 
Survey for various years from 2000 to 2004).   3
The statutory corporate tax rate is clearly important in calculating the overall tax bur-
den. However, this tax rate does not, in itself, establish the ultimate tax burden on the 
firms’ investment activity. Equally crucial are the effects of the depreciation and other 
investment promotion provisions that determine the tax base (Sørensen, 2004). In the 
practice of corporate tax policy different tax depreciation rules are employed that do not 
typically ensure the so-called true economic depreciation (Samuelson, 1964; Sinn, 
1987). Furthermore, their generosity has been extended to stimulate private investment. 
On the other hand, depreciation based upon historical cost is undervalued during in-
flationary phases, as the real cost of depreciation of today’s assets is underestimated 
when the asset base is measured in nominal term (Ott, 1984; Cohen and Hasset, 1999; 
Haufler and Schjelderup, 2000). There have been a number of attempts to estimate the 
current value of a capital good on the basis of indexation (Feldstein, 1979; Feldstein and 
Summers, 1979; Hulten and Wykoff, 1996). “Such a method would provide for equitable 
accounting whether inflation rates were high or low. [But] many agree that it would be too 
complicated to compute the rate of inflation for the multitude of different assets. The idea 
of using an overall index was rejected on the grounds that some assets such as computers 
actually [decline] in price over time and this method would bias investment towards those 
assets that increased in price” (Evans, 1983, p.150). 
A series of corporate tax reforms carried out in EU countries (like Austria, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland and the UK) have generally entailed lower statutory tax rates 
and a reduction in generous tax depreciation provisions (including investment tax al-
lowances, generous geometric-degressive as well as free and accelerated depreciation) 
(see Table 1 and 2). To a large extent this process has been triggered by the fierce tax 
competition among EU members aimed at attracting capital, in particular direct invest-
ment of multinational firms (Keen, 1991; Janeba, 1995; Haufler and Schjelderup, 2000; 
Devereux and Griffith, 2003). 
The tax-rate-cut-cum-base-broadening reform “has interesting effects on firms’ in-
vestment incentives. Most empirical research on the impact of taxes on investment and 
— most theoretical work on tax competition — has focussed on the impact of taxes at 
the margin [...]. Typically corporate income taxes raise the cost of capital — the re-
quired rate of return on an investment — and therefore act as a disincentive to invest.
1 
The two aspects of these reforms have offsetting effects on this disincentive: the lower 
tax rate typically increases the incentive to invest, while the lower allowance decreases   4
it. The combined effect depends on the details of each reform” (Devereux, Griffith and 
Klemm, 2002). 
 
Table 1  Statutory corporate tax rates (%) for SMEs in the selected EU coun-
tries in the case of profit retention 










































































































































































Note: The rates shown in parentheses are standard statutory tax rates existing together with SME-specific 
corporate tax rates. 
Source: Chen, Lee and Mintz (2002), Taxation, SMEs and Entrepreneuship, OECD, Paris; Devereux, 
Griffith and Klemm (2004), Why Has the UK Corporation Tax Raised So Much Revenue?, Fiscal Studies 
25, 367-388; Office of Tax Policy Research (University of Michigan), World Tax Database; KPMG Cor-
porate Tax Rate Survey (Various Years); Ifo Institute for Economic Research. 
                                                                                                                                
1   The principal idea of the user cost of capital approach is that a firm will invest until the point at which 
the marginal product of capital is equal to the cost of capital – so that, at the margin, the project just 
breaks even. As investment increases, the marginal product declines, resulting in a unique profit-
maximising investment level (Hall and Jorgenson, 1967; Auerbach, 1983; King and Fullerton, 1984; 
Sinn, 1987; Devereux and Griffith, 2003; Gordon, Kalambokidis and Slemrod, 2004; Razin, Sadka 
and Nam, 2005).   5
Table 2  Most popular generous tax depreciation rules for SMEs’ equipment investment in selected EU countries when 
normal tax life = 10 years 










































































































































































Note: ita = investment tax allowance, sld = straight-line depreciation, gdd = geometric-degressive depreciation and fd = free depreciation, ad = accelerated depre-
ciation. The depreciation methods and rates shown in parentheses are standard depreciation rules applicable for the investment in equipment. 
Source: Chen, Lee and Mintz (2002), Taxation, SMEs and Entrepreneuship, OECD, Paris; Ifo Institute for Economic Research. 
   6
A similar examination can also be carried out based on the present value model (Atkin-
son and Stiglitz, 1980; Nam and Radulescu, 2005). In other words this study argues that 
discrete investment choices of profit-maximising SMEs are dependent on the post-tax 
net present value. Without taxation, the net present value (NPV) is equal to the present 
value of future gross return, discounted at an appropriate interest rate less investment cost. 
After the introduction of tax on corporate income, the present value of the asset generated 
from an investment amounts to the sum of present value of net return (gross return less 
taxes) and tax savings led by an incentive depreciation provision. An investment project is 
considered to be profitable when the NPV is positive. A superior feature of such a model 
is that one can adequately consider different accounting methods of tax depreciation 
when inflation prevails. 
Ceteris paribus two tax determinants (corporate tax rate and depreciation rule) vary in 
the model simulation, while other relevant parameters such as interest rate, economic 
depreciation, inflation rate, etc. are assumed to remain unchanged. Furthermore, it is a 
general belief that SMEs have limited access to capital markets, both nationally and 
internationally, in part because of the perception of higher risk, informational barriers 
and the involvement in smaller projects, etc. As a result, SMEs have quite often been 
unable to obtain long-term finance in the form of term debt and equity, and a larger part 
of their investments have traditionally been self-financed.
2 
Only in an exceptional case when tax depreciation corresponds to Samuelson’s true 
economic depreciation and its calculation is based on current replacement cost of capital 
is the tax neutrality guaranteed. In spite of the fact that the inflation rate has been gradu-
ally decreased in Europe the low rate still appears to matter for the calculation of the tax 
base and SMEs’ investment decisions. The changes in incentive effects of corporate tax 
policy measures in an inflationary economy can ideally be reflected in an international 
comparison when the country rankings are constructed according to the calculated 
nominal NPV. The study investigates the changes of tax burden on capital caused by the 
corporate tax reform in selected EU nations since the beginning of 1980s. 
 
 
Nominal Net Present Value Model 
 
The generosity of different types of tax concessions in combination with corporate tax 
rates can be measured on the basis of a net present value model. Under the assumptions 
                                            
2   In most OECD countries the corporate tax system encourages debt financing and discriminates against 
SMEs, since corporate interest payments are tax deductible. Such a type of tax non-neutrality between 
the financing methods favours large firms, which have easier access to bank loans (Chen, Lee and 
Mintz, 2002, p. 15).   7
that (i) an equity-financed investment generates an infinite stream of future gross return 
and (ii) this return exponentially declines at a given rate α (0 < α < 1), Samuelson (1964) 
demonstrated in his fundamental theorem of tax-rate invariance that corporate income 
taxation does not affect firms’ investment decisions at all, when true economic deprecia-
tion (TED) — the negative change in value of the asset in the course of time — is deducted 
from an expected gross stream of return when calculating tax profits. And the TED rate is 
the same rate at which the gross return declines in the course of time: i.e. the TED rate = α 
(Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980; Sinn, 1987; Alvarez, Kanniainen and Södersten, 2000; Nam 
and Radulescu, 2005). 
In an economy with the constant inflation rate π but without taxation, an equity-financed 
investment of a profit-maximising SME is on the margin of acceptance at the year of in-
vestment, when  
 
                            ∞                                A0 
(1)    C  =  PV0  =  ∫ A0e
–(α-π+µ)u du  =  ———   
                            0                                α+r 
 
where A0e
–(α-π+µ)u  means nominal gross return at year u generated by an investment cost-
ing C at time 0, which is discounted by the nominal interest rate µ = r + π (0 < r < 1). In 
this case, the sum of annual gross return exponentially decreases at α but increases at π in 
the course of time. In such an equilibrium technically expressed in equation (1), inflation 
does not play any role for the investment decision and NPV (= PV0 – C) amounts to zero. 
Such a steady-state condition usually plays the basis role for the further analyses on corpo-
rate tax systems. 
In the case of adopting geometric-degressive depreciation and if its calculation is made 
based on the current cost accounting system,
3 nominal present value can be expressed as 
 
                               ∞           ∞ 
(2)  nPV(t)0
gdd,cur  =  (1–t) ∫ A0 e 
–{α–π+µ(1–t)}u du + tC ∫ δ e 
–{(δ–π)+µ(1–t)}u du 
                     0           0 
 
                             δ–π                    α–π 
                  = PV0 + tC { —————— – —————— } 
                       δ–π+µ(1–t)         α–π+µ(1–t) 
 
                                            
3   If input prices change, it is necessary to recover the cost of replacing the services consumed in produc-
ing the goods or services for sale at their current prices. Hence, the current cost accounting is generally 
understood as accounting for the current replacement cost of non-monetary assets (see also Nam and 
Radulescu, 2004).   8
where  δ indicates the geometric-degressive depreciation rate and Ce
–(δ–π)u shows the 
(nominal) net book value of capital good in the period u. Therefore, with δ = δ* = α 
nPV(t)*0
gdd,cur = PV0 = C in equilibrium, the so-called tax neutrality is guaranteed
4 and 
inflation does not disturb the investment decision at all. 
When the historical accounting method
5 is applied as the usual case in practice 
 
                               ∞           ∞ 
(3)  nPV(t)0
gdd,his  =  (1–t) ∫ A0 e 
–{α–π+µ(1–t)}u du + tC ∫ δ e 
–{δ+µ(1–t)}u du 
                    0                         0 
 
                                 δ                    α–π 
                  = PV0 + tC { —————— – —————— } 
                         δ+µ(1–t)           α–π+µ(1–t) 
 
where Ce
–δu shows the net book value of capital good in the period u in this case. 
When δ* = α, a fictitious gain (FG) in nominal present value with geometric-degressive 
depreciation emerges through the adoption of historical accounting method since 
nPV(t)0




gdd*  = nPV(t)0
gdd*,his – nPV(t)0
gdd*,cur = nPV(t)0
gdd*,his – PV0 
 
              δ*          δ*–π 
               = tC{ —————— – ——————— }  . 
                δ*+µ(1–t)     δ*–π+µ(1–t) 
 
In the case of employing the historical cost accounting method, the nominal present value 
of the asset with straight-line depreciation at time 0 is 
 
                           ∞                                    Γ 
(5)  nPV(t)0
sld,his  =  (1–t) ∫ A0e
–{α–π+µ(1–t)}u du + t ∫ (C/Γ)e
–{µ(1–t)}u du 
                              0                                    0 
 
 
                                            
4   Comparably the condition δ = α is also the compulsory prerequisite to obtain tax neutrality in the mar-
ginal approach (King and Fullerton, 1984; Sinn, 1987; Sørensen, 2004). 
5   More precisely, under the historical cost accounting system the capital to be recovered before a profit 
is recognised as simply the amount of money originally invested in the firm. Historical profits are, 
therefore, the current period’s revenue subtracted by the historical cost of inputs necessary to secure 
the current period’s expenses. It has long been recognised that increases in input prices can cause his-
torical cost accounting to seriously overstate a firm’s ability to distribute its reported profits, continue 
producing the same physical volume of goods and services, and understate the firm’s capital (see also 
Nam and Radulescu, 2004).   9
                       1–e
–µ(1–t)Γ                 α–π 
                 = PV0 + tC { —————— – —————— }  . 
                                   µ(1–t)Γ            α–π+µ(1–t) 
 
where Γ indicates the normal tax life of a capital good. The true investment promotion 
(TIP) of corporate taxation system accompanied by straight-line depreciation takes place 
when nPV(t)0
sld,his – C > FG
gdd*. 
In the context of free depreciation the sum of C can be fully written off in the first year. 
When employing this depreciation method, the nominal present value of asset at year 0 is 
 
                                 ∞                               1 
(6)  nPV(t)0
fd,his  =  (1–t) ∫ A0e
–{α–π+µ(1–t)}u du + t ∫ Ce
–µ(1–t)u du  
                             0                               0 
 
                              1–e
–µ(1–t)             α–π 
                        =  PV0 + tC{————— – ——————}  . 
                              µ(1–t)          α–π+µ(1–t) 
 
TIP of free depreciation takes place in spite of applying historical accounting method when 
nominal NPV with free depreciation (= nPV(t)0
fd,his – C) is larger than FG
gdd*. 
Furthermore, a certain percentage share of C referred to as investment tax allowance can 
be deducted from gross profit in the first year when calculating the tax base. Investment tax 
allowance is commonly applied in combination with straight-line depreciation. As a con-
sequence, this type of tax incentive provides possibilities of depreciating the value which is 
significantly higher than the original investment cost of a capital good. 
With investment tax allowance, nominal present value of asset at year 0 is 
 
                                               ∞                                 1                        Γ 
(7)  nPV(t)0
ita,his  =  (1–t) ∫ A0e
–{α–π+µ (1–t)}u du + t ∫ (βC)e
–µ(1–t)u du + t ∫ (C/Γ)e
–µ(1–t)u du 
                                        0                                 0            0 
 
                            β{1–e
–µ(1–t)}       1–e
–µ(1–t)Γ               α–π 
                            =  PV0 + tC[ ————— + ————— – ——————]  
                                 µ(1–t)             µ(1–t) Γ         α–π+µ(1–t) 
 
where β indicates the rate of investment tax allowance (0 < β < 1). TIP is expected when 
nPV(t)0
ita,his – C > FG
gdd*. 
Accelerated depreciation is also combined with the straight-line depreciation method. 
Accelerated depreciation expense — as a certain percentage share (σ) of C — is tax-
deductible in the first year of a capital good’s tax life (0 < σ < 1). Consequently, the total   10
depreciation expense in the first year amounts to σC + C/Γ and the total tax life of a capital 
good is reduced correspondingly from Γ to Ω, where Ω = (1 – σ)Γ. In the case of adopting 
the historical accounting method the nominal present value of the asset with accelerated 
depreciation at year 0 is 
 
                                       ∞                              1                                  Ω 
(8)  nPV(t)0
ad,his = (1–t) ∫ A0e
–{α–π+µ (1–t)}u du + t ∫ σCe
–µ (1–t)u du + t ∫ (C/Γ)e
–µ (1–t)u du 
                           0                              0                                   0 
 
                           σ{1–e
–µ (1–t)}          1–e
–µ (1–t)Ω                 α–π 
                            =  PV0 + tC[—————— + —————— – ——————]  . 
                                µ(1–t)                  µ(1–t)Γ    α–π+µ (1–t) 
 
Analogously TIP with accelerated depreciation exists when nPV(t)0




Major Results of Model Simulation 
 
The study investigates the corporate tax reform and its effect on SME’s nominal NPV in 
six selected EU nations ― Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland and the UK ― 
for the period of 1980-2003. Two tax policy measures — corporate tax rate and depre-
ciation provision — change in the model simulation, while other relevant parameters 
like interest rate, economic depreciation, inflation rate, etc. are given. For the calculation 
statutory corporate tax rates and depreciation rules are applied for the individual years, 
which are demonstrated in Tables 1 and 2. Further assumptions made in the simulations 
are A0 = 100; r = 4%, α = δ* = 20%, C = PV0 = 416.7, Γ = 10 years for equipment 
whereas π varies from 2% to 4% and 6%.  
As had been anticipated a priori, the development of FG
gdd* values were positively cor-
related to t and π in the observed period (Tables 3 to 5). In general a constant increase of 
π led to a progressively rising FG
gdd*, although t remained unchanged. Moreover, the 
extent of FG
gdd* change (i.e. increase and decrease) caused by the variation of t gener-
ally became more apparent, when the assumed π got higher. As shown in terms of mean 
values in Tables 3 to 5, the corporate tax reduction introduced in the selected countries 
also contributed to the gradual decrease of FG
gdd*, which is, however, accompanied by 
the slightly increasing standard deviation values in the course of time. 
 
 
   11
Table 3  Effects of corporate tax rate change on SME’s fictitious gain (FGgdd*) 
when π = 2% and δ* = α: investment in equipment 
 Austria 
 





























































































































































































































Common assumptions: A0 = 100, r = 4%, α = δ* =20% and C = PV0 = 416.7. 
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Table 4  Effects of corporate tax rate change on SME’s fictitious gain (FGgdd*) 
when π = 4% and δ* = α: investment in equipment 
 Austria 
 





























































































































































































































Common assumptions: A0 = 100, r = 4%, α = δ* =20% and C = PV0 = 416.7. 
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Table 5  Effects of corporate tax rate change on SME’s fictitious gain (FGgdd*) 
when π = 6% and δ* = α: investment in equipment 
 Austria 
 





























































































































































































































Common assumptions: A0 = 100, r = 4%, α = δ* =20% and C = PV0 = 416.7. 
Source: Table 1 and own calculations. 
 
In most of the investigated countries (except Germany and France) the investment promo-
tion effect of corporate tax system measured in terms of TIP (= NPV with tax depreciation 
rule subtracted by FG
gdd*) continued to decline. Regardless of assumed π, this fact is well 
illustrated by the gradually decreasing mean and standard deviation of TIP values in the 
course of time (Tables 6–8). Moreover the difference between the highest and the lowest 
mean value and the corresponding difference of standard deviation grew with π, although 
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Table 6  True investment promotion (TIP) effect for SMEs in the selected EU 
countries with π = 2%: investment in equipment 
 Austria 
 





























































































































































































































Common assumptions: A0 = 100, r = 4%, α = δ* = 20%, C = PV0 = 416.7 and Γ = 10 years. 
Note: The bold numbers indicate the ITP values (= nominal net present values minus FG
gdd*) and the 
ranks led by corporate tax reforms. The ranks are shown in parentheses. 
Source: Tables 1-3; own calculations. 
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Table 7  True investment promotion (TIP) effect for SMEs in the selected EU 
countries with π = 4%: investment in equipment 
 Austria 
 





























































































































































































































Common assumptions: A0 = 100, r = 4%, α = δ* = 20%, C = PV0 = 416.7 and Γ = 10 years. 
Note: The bold numbers indicate the ITP values (= nominal net present values minus FG
gdd*) and the 
ranks led by corporate tax reforms. The ranks are shown in parentheses. 
Source: Tables 1, 2 and 4; own calculations. 
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Table 8  True investment promotion (TIP) effect for SMEs in the selected EU 
countries with π = 6%: investment in equipment 
 Austria 
 





























































































































































































































Common assumptions: A0 = 100, r = 4%, α = δ* = 20%, C = PV0 = 416.7 and Γ = 10 years. 
Note: The bold numbers indicate the ITP values (= nominal net present values minus FG
gdd*) and the 
ranks led by corporate tax reforms. The ranks are shown in parentheses. 
Source: Tables 1, 2 and 5; own calculations. 
 
In addition one can well identify different ITP development types among the investigated 
EU nations. Austria and Finland belong to the same country group for which those values 
declined in the course of time but with significant fluctuations in the 1990s. A drop of TIP 
value at the end of 1990s is also comparable in these two countries (Figures 1), although 
the decrease is mainly triggered by the generosity reduction of β from 20% to 9% in Aus-
tria and δ from 30% to 25% in Finland. 
Ireland and the UK also had a quite similar TIP development pattern in the past. A rapid 
reduction of its value took place in Ireland in 1992 and two years later also in the UK (Fig-
ure 2). The major reason for this significant change was the substitution of free deprecia-
tion to less generous straight-line depreciation (with 7 years of tax life) in Ireland and to 
geometric-degressive depreciation (with δ = 25%) in the UK, while t remained un-
changed in both reform years (40% in Ireland and 33% in the UK). In the period before   17
as well as after these ‘big bang’ reform years mentioned above the TIP values remained 
stable and developed comparably in both countries. 
The model simulation also suggests that the SME-specific lower corporate tax rates 
can lead — with the given uniform depreciation rule — to less significant investment 
promotion effects than is the case with the normal statutory rates, since the reduction of 
t also causes a decrease in tax savings (Table 9). In spite of the lower tax rates, the TIP 
values for SMEs were smaller than those for large firms in the UK in the period be-
tween 1980 and 1997. Yet the combination of lower tax rate with the more generous 
SME-specific accelerated depreciation (instead of a geometric-degressive one for large 
firms) has created larger scale promotion effects since 1998. 
 
Table 9   Comparison  of  true  investment promotion (TIP) effect between 
SMEs and large firms in the UK: investment in equipment 
SMEs Large  firms   










































































































































































Common assumptions: A0 = 100, r = 4%, α = δ* = 20%, C = PV0 = 416.7 and Γ = 10 years. 
Source: Tables 1, 2 and 6-8; own calculations. 
 
France and Germany are countries whose individual TIP development patterns are quite 
unique. For example, French TIP values remained quite stable at a lower level until 1993 
but at a higher level since 1994. A fast jump of TIP in 1994 was led by a δ increase from 
25% to 37.5% while maintaining t = 33%. German TIP values grew rapidly thanks to the   18
increase in δ from 25% (1980) to 30% (1981) by given t = 56%. Thereafter the TIP 
value remained quite constant, which however sank to the level below zero in 2001, due 
to the simultaneous reduction of t from 40% to 25% and the change of geometric-
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Figure 2





























































The TIP values of individual countries are also compared in terms of international rank of 
competitive position as shown in the parentheses of Tables 6 to 8. With π = 2% the Aus-
trian corporate tax system with investment tax allowance maintained the leading position 
throughout all of the considered years. Under the assumption of π = 4% and 6%, however, 
the country’s first rank was shared with other nations like Ireland (1989–91) and France 
(1999–2003). A number of corporate tax reforms did not change the ranking much. This 
fact applies most apparently for those reforms — in particular the reduction of t — carried 
out in Finland (1986, 1990–3, 1996 and 1999), Germany (1989, 1993 and 1999), France 
(1985, 1987, 1989–90 and 1992), Ireland (1997), and the UK (1983-84, 1986-88, 1995-96 
and 2002). Despite numerous amendments of the corporate tax system, the competitive 
position of individual countries remained less favourable in these reform years. 
On the other hand, some significant consequences of reforms of a positive and also a 
negative kind are observed in France, Ireland and the UK. As illustrated above, the in-
crease of δ from 25% to 37.5% in 1994 (while keeping t = 33.33%) improved France’s 
position from the last to the second. Irish 1992 big bang reform which reduced t from 43% 
to 40% and switched the traditional free depreciation to straight-line depreciation (with 
seven years of tax life), made the country’s competitive position worse off from the second 
to the fourth. A more serious negative consequence was led by British 1994 reform: the 
change from free to geometric-degressive depreciation (δ = 25%) in 1995 — but maintain-
ing specific t = 25% for SMEs — demolished the country’s position. The further reduction 
Figure 3
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of t to 20% and the introduction of accelerated depreciation with σ = 30% in 1999 was 





For the selected six EU countries this study examines the effects of corporate tax reforms 
on SMEs’ investment decisions implemented since the beginning of the 1980s. These re-
forms entailed lower statutory tax rates accompanied by the reduction of generous tax de-
preciation provisions. Among them the UK has traditionally had reduced tax rates for 
SMEs. Under the specific assumptions of relevant parameters, the tax incentive and/or 
burden on investment activity is measured in terms of nominal net present value (NPV). 
Major findings of the model simulation can be summarised as follows: 
•  The application of the historical cost accounting system (instead of the current cost ac-
counting method) in the inflationary economy when calculating tax depreciation 
amounts creates the fictitious gain in nominal NPV (FG
gdd*), although the equity of tax 
depreciation and TED —  the important condition for tax neutrality — is assumed. In 
general this type of gain decreased gradually in the period between 1980–2003, since t 
and π continued to sink in the investigated EU nations. 
•  A down-sloping development is also observed for the TIP value (= nominal NPV with 
tax depreciation scheme minus FG
gdd*). France with an increasing trend was the only 
exception. In addition, different nation groups are identified, based on the TIP values for 
SMEs in the individual countries. A clear similarity of the TIP development pattern pre-
vails in Austria and Finland, on the one hand, as well as in Ireland and the UK, on the 
other. Apart from France, Germany also had a unique feature. 
•  Since SMEs are the majority of firms in the advanced countries, their competitiveness 
significantly affects the competitiveness of an individual nation’s economy as a whole. 
According to the international ranking constructed also on the basis of annual TIP val-
ues, the Austrian investment tax allowance system provided the most favourable condi-
tion for SMEs in the survey years, when π is 2%. Yet the country shared its first posi-
tion with Ireland and France if the same rate increases to 4% or 6%. A series of corpo-
rate tax reforms made in Germany and Finland were not able to enhance their low ranks 
much. In contrast to the positive reform consequence like the French case in 1994, Irish 
and British tax policy interventions, which replaced free depreciation, destroyed their 
leading competitive position in the first half of 1990s. 
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